Discovery of Malicious Attacks to Improve Mobile Collaborative Learning
  (MCL) by Razaque, Abdul & Elleithy, Khaled
 Discovery of Malicious Attacks to Improve 
Mobile Collaborative Learning (MCL) 
Abdul Razaque and Khaled Elleithy 
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Bridgeport, 
Bridgeport, CT 06604, USA 
 
arazaque@bridgeport.edu , elleithy@bridgeport.edu
 
Abstract 
Mobile collaborative learning (MCL) is highly acknowledged and focusing paradigm in eductional 
institutions and several organizations across the world. It exhibits intellectual synergy of various 
combined minds to handle the problem and stimulate the social activity of mutual understanding. 
To improve and foster the baseline of MCL, several supporting architectures, frameworks includ-
ing number of the mobile applications have been introduced. 
Limited research was reported that particularly focuses to enhance the security of those pardigms 
and provide secure MCL to users. The paper handles the issue of rogue DHCP server that affects 
and disrupts the network resources during the MCL. The rogue DHCP is unauthorized server that 
releases the incorrect IP address to users and sniffs the traffic illegally. The contribution specially 
provides the privacy to users and enhances the security aspects of mobile supported collaborative 
framework (MSCF). The paper introduces multi-frame signature-cum anomaly-based intrusion 
detection systems (MSAIDS) supported with novel algorithms through addition of new rules in IDS 
and mathematcal model. The major target of contribution is to detect the malicious attacks and 
blocks the illegal activities of rogue DHCP server. This innovative security mechanism reinforces 
the confidence of users, protects network from illicit intervention and restore the privacy of users. 
Finally, the paper validates the idea through simulation and compares the findings with other ex-
isting techniques. 
GeneralTerms: Design, Development, Theory.  
Index Terms 
Client, DHCP server, rogue DHCP server, mobile learning environment, algorithms, signature-
cum anomaly based Intrusion detection. Inclusion of IDS rules, sniffer, nikito, stick. 
1- Introduction 
The rapid developments in information technologies (IT) have improvised the use of mo-
bile devices in open, large scale and heterogeneous environments. 
The mobile devices provide the bridge to connect learners with institutions directly.  This 
highly emerged platform has put the concrete foundation of MCL to corroborate pedagog-
ical activities. The deployment of mobile devices has not only underpinned MCL but also 
created many chances for malicious attackers to crack the integrity and privacy of users. 
The mobile users are highly dependent on DHCP server for issuance of IP addresses. 
The DHCP server provides highly organized and useful administrative service to mobile 
devices. However, unauthorized and misconfigured DHCP server (rogue DHCP) is used 
  
 
into a network; it creates the problems for users, breaking the security. It invites the in-
truders and attackers to redirect & intercept network traffic of any device that uses the 
DHCP. Attacker (The man-in-middle) modifies the original contents of communication. 
The malware and Trojans horse install rogue DHCP server automatically on network and 
affect the legitimate servers. 
If the rogue DHCP server assigns an incorrect IP address faster than original DHCP serv-
er, it causes the potentially black hole for users. To control the malicious attacks and 
avoiding the network blockage, the network administrators put their efforts to guarantee 
the components of server, using various tools. The graphical user interface (GUI) tool is 
used to prevent the attack of rogue detection [5]. Idea of using multilayer swiches may be 
configured to control the attacks of rogue DHCP server but it is little bit complex and not 
efficient to detect rogue DHCP server and its malicious consequences [7] & [8].  
Time-tested, DHCP Find Roadkil.net’s, DHCP Sentry, Dhcploc.exe and DHCP-probe 
provide the solution to detect and defend rogue DHCP server malware [6]. All of these 
tools cannot detect the new malicious attacks. 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) are also introduced to ensure the protection of systems 
and networks. However, IDS cannot detect the intrusion due to increase in size of net-
works. The Signature based detection does not have capacity to compare each packet with 
each signature in database [2].  
Distributed Intrusion Detection System (DIDS) is another technique to support the mobile 
agents. This technique helps the system to sense the intrusion from incoming and out-
going traffics to detect the known attacks [1]. Ant colony optimization (ACO) based dis-
tributed intrusion detection system is introduced to detect intrusions in the distributed en-
vironments. It detects the visible activities of attackers and identifies the attack of false 
alarm rate [3]. 
Anomaly based intrusion detection are introduced to detect those attacks for which no 
signatures exist [4], [6], [10].Both signature based and anomaly based IDS have not been 
used to detect the problems of rogue DHCP server. This paper introduces the multi-frame 
signature-cum anomaly based intrusion detection system supported with novel algo-
rithms, inclusion of new rules in IDS and mathematical model to detect the malicious at-
tacks and increase the privacy and confidentiality of users in MCL environment. 
3. Related work 
The modern technologies and its deployment in computer and mobile devices have not 
only created new opportunities for better services but from other perspective, privacy of 
the users is highly questionable. The network-intruder and virus contagion extremely af-
fect the computer systems and its counterparts. They also alter the top confidential data. 
Handling these issues and restoring the security of systems, IDS are introduced to control 
malicious attackers. IDS are erroneous and not providing the persistent solution in its cur-
rent shape. The first contribution in the field of intrusion detection was deliberated by J.P 
Anderson in [28]. He introduced notion about the security of computer systems and relat-
ed threats. Initially, he discovered three attacks that are misfeasors, external penetrations 
and internal penetrations. 
 3 
 
 The classification of typical IDS is discussed in [17]. The focus of the contribution is 
about reviewing the agent-based IDS for mobile devices. They have stated the problems 
and strength of each category of classification and suggested the methods to improve the 
performance of mobile agent for IDS design.  
Four types of attacks are discussed in [21] for security of network. They have also simu-
lated the behavior of these attacks by using simulation of ns2. A multi-ant colonies tech-
nique is proposed in [25] for clustering the data. It involves independent, parallel ant col-
onies and a queen ant agent.  They state that each process for ant colony takes dissimilar 
forms of ants at moving speed. They have generated various clustering results by using 
ant-based clustering algorithm.  The findings show that outlier’s lowest strategy for 
choosing the recent data set has the better performance. The contribution covers the clus-
tering-based approach.  
The discussed work in [23], implements the genetic algorithm (GA) with IDS to prevent 
the network from the attack of intruders. The focus of technique is to use information 
theory to scrutinize the traffic and thus decrease the complexity. They have used linear 
structure rules to categorize the activities of network into abnormal and normal behaviors. 
The work done in [18] is about the framework of distributed Intrusion Detection System 
that supports mobile agents. The focus of work is to sense the both outside and inside 
network division. The mobile-agents control remote sniffer, data and known attacks. 
They have used data mining method for detection and data analysis. Dynamic Multi-
Layer Signature based (DMSIDS) is proposed in [2]. It detects looming threats by using 
mobile agents. Authors have introduced small and well-organized multiple databases. The 
small signature-based databases are also updated at the same time regularly. 
Algorithm is presented for adaptive network intrusion detection (ANID). The base of al-
gorithm is on naive decision tree and naive Bayesian classifier [19]. The algorithm per-
forms detection and keeps the track of false positive at balanced level for various types of 
network attacks. It also handles some problems of data mining such as dealing with lost 
attribute values, controlling continuous attributes and lessening the noise in training data. 
Work is tested by using KDD99 benchmark for intrusion detection dataset. The experi-
ment has reduced the false positive by using limited resources.  
Moreover, all of the proposed techniques cover general idea of network detection but 
proposed MSAIDS technique handles the irreplaceable issues of DHCP rogue server. It 
controls signature and anomaly based attacks to be generated by DHCP rogue. The con-
tribution also prevents almost all types of attacks. The major contribution of work is to 
validate the technique by employing innovative algorithms, inclusion of new rules in tra-
dition IDS and mathematical model. It also helps the legitimate users to start secure and 
reliable MCL frequently. One of the most promising aspects of this research is unique-
ness because there is no single contribution is available in survey about the DHCP rogue 
and its severe targeted attacks. 
4.  Possible Attacks of Rogue DHCP Server (SCENARIO-I) 
With deployment of latest technologies, the need for automated tools has been increased 
to protect the information stored either on computers or flowing on networks. The generic 
idea to protect the data and thwart the malicious attackers is computer security. The intro-
duction of distributed system has highly affected the security [11]. 
  
 
There are several forms of vulnerabilities and vigorous threats to expose the security of 
the systems. To take important security measures and enhancing the secure needs for or-
ganizations, several mechanisms are implemented but those mechanisms also invite the 
attackers to play with privacy and confidentiality of users. One of the major threats for 
privacy of data is intervention of rogue DHCP server. 
The first sign of problem associated with rogue DHCP server is discontinuation of net-
work service. The static and portable devices start experiencing due to network issues. 
The issues are started by assigning the wrong IP address to requested clients to initiate the 
session. The malicious attackers take the advantages of rogue DHCP server and sniff the 
traffic sent by legitimate users.  
Rogue DHCP server spreads the wrong network parameters that create the bridge for at-
tackers to expose the confidentiality and privacy. Trojans like DNS-changing installs the 
rogue DHCP server and pollutes the network. It provides the chance to attackers to use 
the compromised resources on the network.Rogue DHCP server creates several problems 
to expose the privacy of legitimate users. The most three important attacks are shown in 
figure 1. 
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Fig. 1. Behavior of DHCP Rogue during the attack 
4.1.Network disrupting attack 
Rogue DHCP server makes the vague situation for legitimate DHCP server by sending 
many requests for issuance of IPs. This situation exhausts the pool of IP addresses of 
DHCP server, resulting it does not entertain the requests of clients for lease of new IPs. 
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When process of issuance of IPs is blocked then rogue DHCP server appears in network 
as replacement of legitimate DHCP server. The rogue DHCP server releases the wrong 
network settings and in consequence causes the network disruption. 
 The DHCP server responds faster than corporate server on local area network for release 
of IP addresses. Rogue DHCP server continuously monitors the behavior of DHCP server 
and whenever any request comes through router for release of IP address, it issues the 
wrong IP address faster than legitimate DHCP server. Router does not have capability to 
detect issued IP address from rogue DHCP server. Once it issues its wrong IP address 
then continuously disrupts the network.  Several mechanisms are introduced such as net-
work access control (NAC) and network access protection (NAP) to force all the connect-
ed devices to be responsible for authentication to network.  
The devices which do not meet the criteria of authentication are segmented on subnet or 
virtual Local area network (VLAN).  All of these methods are challenging and difficult to 
deploy to protect the network disruption from attack of rogue DHCP server. To employ 
these mechanism, DHCP snooping must be implemented on switches otherwise users will 
not be able to obtain the information but from other side NAC and NAP are limited with 
some specific operating systems. These techniques are not efficient to control the attack 
rogue DHCP server. 
 It takes the control of whole network and also continues the connecting and disconnect-
ing process at different intervals. The figure 2 shows the attacking process of DHCP 
rogue server and disruption of network. 
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Fig. 2. Network disrupting attacking process 
 
4.2.Sniffing The Network Traffic  
It is brutal irony in information security that the features which are used to protect the 
static and portable devices to function in efficient and smooth manner; and from other 
  
 
side same features maximize the chances for attackers to compromise and exploit the 
same tools and networks. 
 Hence packet sniffing is used to monitor network traffic to prevent the network from bot-
tleneck and make an efficient data transmission. Attackers use the same resources for col-
lecting information for illegal use. Rogue DHCP server substantiates those malicious at-
tackers to expose the privacy of users. When networks are victim of rogue DHCP servers 
that provide very important information related to IP address, domain name system and 
default gateway to attackers. 
Rogue DHCP server sets default gateway as IP address of malicious attacker’s proxy. In 
this case, attacker can sniff the traffic and wreak the privacy of users shown in figure 3.  
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Fig. 3. Sniffing the traffic and masquerading attack 
 
Rogue DHCP server also helps the intruders to capture the MAC address of legitimate 
users. It causes the sniffing the traffic through switch. In this case, attackers spoof the IP 
addresses of both sender and receiver and play the man-of-middle to sniff the traffic and 
extract important contents of communication.  
 
4.3.Denial of service attack ( DOS) 
Intruders that get support through rogue DHCP server also use DOS attacks after sniffing 
the confidential contents of traffic. Due to DOS attack, the access of important services 
for legitimate users is blocked.  Intruders often crash the routers, host, servers and other 
computer entity by sending overwhelming amount of traffic on the network. 
 Rogue DHCP server creates friendly environment for intruders to launch DOS attacks 
because intruders need small effort for this kind of attack and it is also difficult to detect 
and attack back to intruders. In addition, it is also easy to create the floods on internet be-
cause it is comprised of limited resources including processing power, bandwidth and 
storage capabilities. Rogue DHCP can make flooding attack at the domain name system 
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(DNS) because target of intruders is to prevent the legitimate users from resolving re-
source pertaining to zone under attack [12] [13] & [16].  
These attacks on DNS have obtained varying success while disturbing resolution of 
names related to the targeted zone. Rogue DHCP server can take advantages of inevitable 
human errors during installation, configuration and developing the software.  It creates 
several types of DOS attack documented in literature [20]. [22] & [24].  Intruders with 
support of Rogue DHCP server make three types of fraggle or smurf, SYN Flood and 
DNS Attacks DOS attacks shown in figure 4. These attacks are vulnerable and dangerous 
for security point of view. 
Mobile 
Supported 
content  server
(MSCS)
DHCP Server
Rogue DHCP 
Server
AT 100.1.1.1/24
Streaming server
(Live content provider)
Router
USER-A( SENDER)
USER-B( RECEIVER)
21
6-
87
-
10
8-
95
21
6-
87
-
10
8-
94
216-87-108-93 216-87-108-90
216-87-108-92
216-87-108-91
216-87-
108-89
-216.87.108.88
$
MODIFIES 
PACKETS$
CAPTURES 
PACKETS
USER-C( MAN-IN-MIDDLE)
ILLEGAL IP 
ADDRESSES
AUTHENTICATION SERVER
216-87-108-88
216
-87
-10
8-8
8
USER PROFILES
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
11
10
7
LE
GA
L 
IP
 A
DD
RE
SS
ES
DENIAL OF ATTACK (DOS)
 
Fig. 4. Denial of service attack (DOS) attack 
 
5. Proposed Solution (Multi- Fram Signature- Cum –Anomaly Based 
Intrusion Detection System) 
 
 Networks are being converged rapidly and thousands of heterogeneous devices are con-
nected. The devices integrated in large networks, communicate through several types of 
protocols and technologies. This large scale heterogeneous environment invites the in-
truders to expose the security of users.  Hence, IDS are introduced to recognize the pat-
terns of attacks, if they are not fixed strategically, many attackers cross the IDS by trav-
ersing alternate route in network.  
Many signature-based IDS are available to detect the attacks but some of new attacks 
cannot be identified and controlled. Anomaly-based IDS is another option but it can only 
detect new patterns of attack. The multi-frame signature-cum anomaly-based intrusion 
detection system (MSAIDS) supported with algorithms is proposed to resolve the issue of 
DHCP rogue. The proposed framework consists of detecting server that controls IDS and 
its related three units: (i) DHCP verifier unit (ii) signature database and (iii) anomaly da-
tabase. During each detection process, intrusion detection starts matching from DHCP 
verifier, if any malicious activity is detected that stops the process otherwise checks other 
  
 
two units until finds whether activity is malicious or not. Figure 5 shows the MSAIDS. 
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Fig. 5. Multi-frame signature-cum-anomaly based IDS 
The detecting server (DS) is responsible to check the inbound and outbound traffic for 
issuance of IP address. The DS gets IP request (inbound traffic) through routers and for-
wards to DHCP server after satisfactory checkup. When any IP address is released for 
requested node then applies DHCP detecting algorithm for validation of DHCP server and 
detecting the types of attack shown in algorithm 1.  
Algorithm 1: Verify DHCP server and detecting the attack 
1. Input: MF =(FD, FS,FA & I) 
2. Output : For every strategy I € FA, I € FS, D € FD) 
3. D = Each valid DHCP Server 
4. IP= Internet protocol address 
5. N= Number of mobile devices 
6. FD= Frame DHCP server 
7.  If D € FD 
8. IP→ N 
9. endif 
10. S= Number of available signatures in signature based IDS (SIDS) 
11. FS= Frame of signatures 
12. FS ⊆ SIDS 
13. I= Number & Types of attacks 
14.  For ( I=S;  I ≤ FS; I++) 
15. If   I  ⊆ FS 
16. SIDS attack alert 
17. endif 
18. endfor 
19. A= Number of signatures available in Anomaly based Intrusion detection system 
AIDS 
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20. FA= Frame of AIDS 
21. FA ⊆ AIDS 
22. For  ( I =A; I ≤ FA ;  I ++) 
23.  If  I  € FA 
24. AIDS raises alert 
25. If ( I ∉ FS & I ∉ FA) 
26.  No alert ( No attack) 
27. endif 
28. endif 
29. endfor 
 
5.1.Central IDS 
The aim of central IDS is to control and store messages received from DS. It works as 
middleware for DS and other layers to send the verification request and receive the alerts. 
The main function of central IDS is to update and manage the policy according to attack. 
If it needs any change in attack detection that is employed on all the layers. The central 
IDS implements the updated policy is shown in figure no 6. 
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Fig.  6. Policy of Central IDS for network 
5.2.DHCP Verifier 
 DHCP verifier is the top layer that distinguishes between rogue DHCP and original 
DHCP server. The signatures of original DHCP servers are stored at the DHCP verifier. It 
checks the validity of the DHCP server that issues IP address for client. On the basis of 
stored signatures, DHCP server is identified whether it is rogue or original DHCP server.  
Top layer produces the unique alert sign for both DHCP rogue and original DHCP. Top 
layer receives the parameters for verification from central IDS. DHCP verifier running on 
top layer is also responsible to return the alert to central IDS. 
5.3.Signature based detection layer 
Signature-based detection is middle layer that detects known threat. It compares the sig-
natures with observed events to determine the possible attacks.  Some known attacks are 
identified on the basis of implemented security policy. For example, if telnet tries to use 
“root’ username that is violating the security policy of organization that is considered the 
  
 
known attack.  
If operating system has 645 status code values that is indication of host’s disabled audit-
ing and refers as attack. If attachment is with file name “freepics.exe” that is alert of 
malware. Middle layer is effective for detection of known threats and using well-defined 
signature patterns of attack. The stored patterns are encoded in advance to match with 
network traffics to detect the attack. This layer compares log entry with list of signatures 
by deploying string comparison operation.  
If signature based layer does not detect any network, anomaly based detection layer initi-
ates the process. For example, if request is made for web page and to be received the 
message with status code of 403, it shows that request is declined and such types of pro-
cessing cannot be tailored with signatures based layer.   
5.4.Anomaly Based Detection Layer 
Lower layer is anomaly based detection that identifies unknown and DOS attacks. It 
works on pick-detect method. This method monitors the inbound and outbound traffic 
received through central IDS. Packets are evaluated, adaptive threshold and mean values 
are set. It calculates the metrics and compares with threshold [26] & [27]. 
 On the basis of comparisons, it detects various types of anomalies including false posi-
tive, false negative, true positive and true negative. If pick-detect methods determines true 
positive and false negative then it sends alert to Central IDS. The process of determining 
the anomalies is given in algorithm 2. 
Algorithm 2: Detecting the types of alerts with AIDS 
1. FA= Frame of signatures 
2. FA ⊆ AIDS 
3. Si =  False Negative 
4. Sj= True negative 
5. Sk=  True positive 
6. Sl=  False positive 
7.  0 =  don’t match  & 1=  match 
m 
8. Sijkl = 1/d  ∑    Sijkl 
                  m=1 
9. Sij = { 0,  if  i & j 
10. No false negative & true positive  
11. Sij = { 1,  if  i & j 
12. false negative & true positive  
13. Alert of attack 
14. Skl = { 0,  if  k & l [ do not match] & 1, if  k &  l [match] 
15. Alert of true negative & false positive 
16. No sign of attack 
17. endif 
18. endif 
19. endif 
20. endif 
In addition to determine and calculate true positive, true negative, false positive and false 
negative, the following derivation helps: 
Here True positive= TP; False negative= FN; False positive=FP; True negative=TN; Pre-
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cision= p; overall probability= OP 
We know that  
P = TP/ TP + FP                                                                                                           (1) 
OP= TP + TN / TP + FP + FN + TN                                                                            (2)  
TP = P (TP +FN)                                                                                                          (3)  
Substitute the values of precision in equation no (2) 
Therefore,   
 TP= TP/ TP + FP (TP +FN)                                                                                         (4)  
OR 
TP = (TP * TP) + (TP + FN) / TP + FP                                                                         (5)  
OR 
TP= TP
2 +
 (TP* FN) / TP + FP 
The equation (5) shows the true positive (TP), meaning that is sign of attack and alarm 
occurs 
Now, find the false negative to apply overall probability formula: 
We know that overall probability formula that is given as follows: 
OP= TP + TN / TP + FP + FN + TN 
TP = OP (TP + FP + FN + TN) = TP + TN                                                                    (6)  
Substitute the value of OP in equation (6): 
TP = TP + TN / TP + FP + FN + TN (TP + FP + FN + TN) = TP + TN                        (7) 
 (TP + TN) * TP + (TP + TN)* FP + (TP + TN) *FN + (TP + TN)*TN / TP + FP + FN + 
TN = TP +TN                                                                                                                 (8)  
Multiplying the values: 
(TP
2 +
 TNTP) + (TP*FP + TN*FP) + (TP*FN + TN*FN) + (TP*TN + TN
2
) = TP + TN 
(TP + FP + FN + TN)                                                                                                     (9)  
Re-arranging: 
(TP
2 +
 TNTP) + (TP*FP + TN*FP) + (TP*TN + TN
2
)=( TP + TN ( TP + FP + FN + TN) - 
(TP*FN + TN*FN) 
Multiplying the (TP + TN) to the right hand side: 
(TP
2 +
 TN*TP) + (TP*FP + TN*FP) + (TP*TN + TN
2
) = (TP
2
 + TN*TP +FP*TP 
+FP*TN+ FN*TP + FN*TN + TN*TP + TN
2 
- (TP*FN +  
TN*FN)                                                                                                                         (10)  
Simplifying the terms by using addition and subtraction function: 
FN*TN - FN*TN                                                                                                          (11)  
Finding the value of FN 
FN = FN * TN /TN                                                                                                       (12)  
Divide TN with FN *TN to get FN 
FN= FN                                                                                                                         (13)  
OR 
FN-FN= 0 
If we get zero value that shows the false negative and considered as attack but no sign of 
alarm because of 0. The false positive (FP) is derived from true positive (TP). If we know 
that about the value of TP: 
TP= TP
2 
+ (TP * FN) / TP + FP 
Cross by multiplication to both sides: 
TP (TP + FP) = TP
2 +
 (TP + FN)                                                                                    (14)  
Multiplying TP to the left hand side: 
TP
2
 +TP*FP = TP
2 +
 (TP * FN)                                                                                     (15)  
Re-arrange the terms: 
FNTP =TP
2 +
 TP * FP - TP
2
 
  
 
FN*TP = TP * FP                                                                                                          (16)  
Calculate the FP from equation (16): 
FN*TP= FP/TP                                                                                                              (17)  
OR 
FP= FNTP /TP 
 The equation (17) shows the false positive; there is no sign of attack but alarm raised. 
 Applying equation (10) to find the true negative (TN). 
Here, 
FN*TN - FN*TN 
FN*TN = FN*TN 
TN = FN*TN/ FN                                                                                                         (18)  
Dividing FN*TN by FN to find TN 
TN= TN                                                                                                                         (19)  
OR 
TN-TN=0 
The value of TN is also zero that means there is no sign of alarm and no attack occurs. 
To detect the attack and non-attack situation for TN and FN. We use algorithm 3 to de-
termine sign of attack. 
Algorithm 3: Determine the sing of attack or non-sign of attack 
I. We select random odd prime number for TN and any even number for FN. 
2. The value of FN must not be exceeded than TN. 
3. Therefore, FN > 1 & FN< TN 
4. Here, FN= {2, 4, 6, 8…} & TN= {3, 5, 7, 11, 13…} 
5. Here sign of attack = ST, d = not exposed & b = exposed. 
6. b and d has constant value 1. 
7. Thus, ST = TN/ (TN+ d)/ FN (FN +b) 
8. If value of ST > 1, it means there is no sign of attack, if the value of ST < 1 that is sign 
of attack. 
9. endif 
Assume FN = 2 & TN =3 
BY applying the sign of attack formula: 
ST = TN/ (TN+ d)/ FN (FN +b) 
Substitute the values in given formula. 
ST = 3/ (3+ 1) / 2(2+1) 
ST = 9/8 
ST= 1.125 
ST > 1 
ST > 1 means there is no sign of attack and we will be able to determine that is True nega-
tive (TN).  
6. Simulation Setup 
The previous sections have presented the evidence of the problems to be created by rogue 
DHCP server and including solution to control over these problems. This section focuses 
on simulation setup and analysis of the result. The unique and extensive testing method 
for rogue DHCP needs various kinds of intrusions to validate the claim. The basic pur-
pose of testing is to obtain the results in controlled and live user environments. However, 
overall target is to obtain the result in highly loaded network. We have used three types of 
simulation ns2, discrete simulation in C++ and testbed. We here discuss only testbed sim-
ulation. The testing procedure is done on two types of fast and slow systems. The slow 
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system is used for capturing the attacks while fast is reserved for generating attacks. The 
simulation also uses Nikto that helps to detect the attacks from web applications because 
snort only captures the binary or data files. Snort stores these files in var /log/snort direc-
tory. They are analyzed with editor or simple network management protocol (SNMP) 
manager such as Open NMS [14] & [15]. MySQL database is used to create the alert data. 
Other database such as oracle can also be used but we give priority to MySQL because 
used Snort-2 IDS is more suitable and familiar with this. Apache web server is also part 
of this simulation that supports HTTP-based web server.  
To create the interface between web server and MySQL, we use PHP that links both suc-
cessfully. PHP package also uses Analysis Console for Intrusion Databases (ACID) that is 
supportive for analyzing the snort data. After analysis the packets, gif draw (GD) library 
is used to make graphs and these graphs are presented with help of (PHPLOT). ACID 
needs to be connected with MySQL to analyze the data. So, it uses Active Data Objects 
Data Base (ADODB). To monitor the performance of IDS, stress test utility (Stick) is 
used that generates the higher amount of malicious traffic and conceals the false attack in 
order to test the functionality of IDS.  The detail of parameters used for simulation is giv-
en in table 1. 
TABLE 1: Simulation parameters for experiment 
 
Name of parameters Specification 
MySQL database MySQL 5.5 
Type of IDS Rule based IDS 
GD Library gd 2.0.28 
Snort V-2 
Apache web server Apache http 2.0.64 Released 
PHP  PHP 5.3.8 ( General purpose server side 
language) 
Stick Stick beats detection tool used by hack-
ers 
Nikto Nikto v.2.1.4 
IDS enabled system  Memory 512 MB  
Operating 
system 
Linux 
PCI net-
work card 
10/100 Mbps 
CPU  P-III with 600 MHz 
Attacker system Operating 
System 
Linux 
Memory 1.5 GB 
  PCI 
Network 
card  
10/100/1000 Mbps 
 
 CPU AMD Geode LX running 
2.4/5GHz 
  
 
7. Anaysis of Result and Discussion  
The training period of experiment covers four classes of attacks probe, DOS, U2R and 
R2L. The experiment sets the value of minimum frequency to 1 and relates the number to 
valid time. So, detected attacks are included in database during the training period. The 
MSAIDS scans all of the rules of snort and includes new rules explained in proposed sec-
tion 3. The testing period targets several concise scenarios. The scenarios are simulated 
by using same parameters for all of the three existing schemes and one for our proposed 
MSAIDS scheme. The attacks are generated by using stick, covering all types of signa-
tures and anomaly based attacks.  
The training period provides quite interesting results because frequently generated attacks 
are of different numbers. The maximum number of attacks pertains to R2L category. The 
more attacks are also counted on MSAIDS as compare with other three existing tech-
niques are shown in table.2. If attack is not generated then it is counted as normal traffic. 
The frequency of single and group characters is displayed when packets reach at the at-
tacker machine and they are analyzed. It is observed on the basis of output that different 
types of detected attacks to be generated due to rogue DHCP server. 
The DOS attacks are detected when packet does not reach at destination and received no 
acknowledgment. The sign of probe attack is addition of new data in existing amount of 
data bytes that shows the alteration in the original data. U2R is the sign of maximum con-
nection duration. R2L attacks are more complex to detect because they use host and net-
work based features. Therefore, we apply method comprises of service requested and du-
ration of connection for network and attempts failed login for host. 
    It shows that proposed approach does not restrict the generating ratio of packet. From 
other side, the proposed work provides promising capturing ratio for signature as well as 
anomaly based attacks. The statistical results show that MSAIDS will substantiate to 
medical field for diagnosing several disease and especially for heart. The major break-
through of this research is to detect the true positive and false negative attacks because 
they are very hard to capture. 
TABLE 2: showing statistical data for attack
 
 Due to these anomalies, confidentiality of any system is exploited and privacy of the user 
is exposed. The proposed method also captures the real worm attacks and all other loom-
ing attacks. The proposed approach is highly supported with new rules, mathematical 
model and algorithms that collectively make the MSAIDS smarter and quite successful. 
The table 3 shows quantitative results for each scheme. 
  
Type of generated 
attack 
Multi frame 
signature-
cum- anoma-
ly based IDS 
(MSAIDS) 
Dynamic Multi-
Layer Signature 
based IDS 
(DMSIDS) 
Ant Colony Optimi-
zation based  IDS 
(ACOIDS) 
Signature based 
IDS 
DOS attacks 34214 33542 33421 32741 
U2R attacks 12454 11874 11845 11341 
R2L attacks 34123 32123 31092 29984 
Probe attacks 6214 8758 10181 4907 
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TABLE 3: Showing quantitative data for proposed and existing schemes 
 
The major advantage of MSAIDS approach is to detect all types of anomalies and un-
known threats efficiently. The systems are mostly infected due to new sort of malwares 
because they consume the processing resources of system. If resources of system are uti-
lized by unnecessary programs then MCL is highly affected.  In consequence, collabora-
tion process is disrupted. MSAIDS also detects the activity for any specific session. It 
creates specific alarm for each type of anomalies. The figures 7 to 10 show the capturing 
capability of anomalies and compares with other well known techniques. The implemen-
tation of MSAIDS is also supported with sound architectural design. Statistical data is 
highly encouraging that shows 99.996% the overall capturing capability of all types of 
signatures and anomaly based attacks.  
The overall capturing capability of MSAIDS is calculated with following formula. 
Here, overall Capturing capability = Ea; total generated signature based attacks = TSA; 
Total anomaly based attacks =TAS; missed signature based attacks = MSA; 
Missed anomaly based attacks = MAA & total generated attacks = TGA.  
Thus, Ea = (TSA + TAA) – MSA + MAA) * 100 / TGA
On basis of given formula, we prove overall strength of MSAIDS technique that is given 
in figure 11.  
Parameters Multi frame 
signature-
cum- anomaly 
based IDS 
(MSAIDS) 
Dynamic 
Multi-Layer 
Signature 
based IDS 
(DMSIDS) 
Ant Colony 
Optimization 
based  IDS 
(ACOIDS) 
Signa-
ture 
based 
IDS 
total no: of packet  to be received 236719 198678 201938 178109 
total no: of packet  to be analyzed 236456 192453 197842 170098 
total no: of attack  to be generated 87005 86293 86539 78973 
total no: of signature based attack to be 
generated 
42003 42287 42585 35098 
total  no: of anomaly based attack to be 
generated 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d. True negative 
a. 9475 
b. 12093 
c. 18574 
d. 4860 
 
a. 8574 
b. 11987 
c. 16943 
d. 6502 
 
a. 8878 
b. 12007 
c. 16943 
d. 6126 
 
a. 8458 
b. 11289 
c. 12455 
d. 11673 
 
Total number of anomaly based attack 
to be generated 
45002 44006 43954 43875 
total no: of attacks to be captured 87002 84212 83434 36098 
Anomaly based attacked captured 
a. False positive 
b. False negative 
c. True positive 
d. True negative 
a. 9475 
b. 12093 
c. 18574 
d. 4859 
 
a. 8324 
b. 11456 
c. 15678 
d. 6324 
 
a. 8678 
b. 11987 
c. 16789 
d. 6045 
 
a. 654 
b. 245 
c. 453 
d. 535 
 
total number of anomaly based attacks 
to be captured 
45001 41782 43499 1887 
signature based attacks to be captured 42001 42102 41091 34211 
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Fig. 7. True positive anomaly % at different time interval 
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Fig..9. True Positive anomaly% at different time interval 
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Fig. 8. True Negative anomaly% at different time interval 
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Fig.11. Overall capturing capability of MSAIDS VS other known techniques 
 
8. Conclusion  
In this paper, multi-frame signature-cum anomaly-based intrusion detection systems 
(MSAIDS) is proposed. MSAIDS controls malicious activities of DHCP rogue server to 
restore the privacy of users during MCL. The paper highlights all the malicious threats to 
be generated by DHCP rogue. The intruders use the DHCP server to sniff the traffic and 
finally deteriorate the confidential information. The mechanism of current IDS does not 
have enough capability to control the threats. Furthermore, several daunting and thrilling 
challenges in the arena of computer network security are impediment for secure commu-
nication.  DHCP rogue is visibly very simple but crashes the network as well as the priva-
cy of the users and even creates nastier attacks like Sniffing network traffic, masquerad-
ing attack, shutting down the systems and DOS. The first is detailed explanation of these 
attacks and how they are generated by DHCP rogue. To resolve this issue, second pro-
pose the technique that is based on algorithms, mathematical modeling and addition of 
new rules in current IDS. These all of the components of proposal collectively handles the 
issues of DHCP rogue. To validate the proposal, the technique is simulated by using two 
different kinds of systems, as one is reserved for attacker and other one is for legitimate 
user. 
On the basis of simulation, we obtain very interesting statistical data, which show that 
MSAIDS improves the capturing performance and controls the attacks to be generated by 
DHCP rogue as compare with original IDS and other techniques. The findings demon-
strate that MSAIDS has significantly reduced the false alarms. 
Finally, we analyze the overall efficiency of MSAIDS and existing technique by showing 
the results in tabular form and plotting the impact of results.  In future, this technique will 
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be deployed to measure the heart beats and other disease. Furthermore the broader impact 
of this research is to substantiate the MCL and improve the pedagogical activities and 
fostering other organizational requirements. This research will also boost the confidential 
level of the people while using MCL. 
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